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Abstract:  The process of institutional transition was deeply influenced by the government’s 
behavior, which is the fundamental element in institutional transition analysis. The origin of 
government’s different behavior comes from philosophy and two conventions in economics. The 
rationalism leads to constructivism and the empiricism leads to evolutionism, these conventions in 
economics cause different government’s behavior in the institutional transition. After analyzing 
these differences, we make a conclusion that the government should pay attention to special initial 
conditions and compromise two conventions in economics, and then select appropriate tactic for the 
regional economic development. 
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Résumé: Le processus de transition institutionnelle a été profondément influencée par le 
comportement du gouvernement, qui est un élément fondamental dans l’analyse de la transition 
institutionnelle. L’origine des comportements différents du gouvernement réside dans la 
philosophie et deux conventions économiques. Le rationalisme conduit au constructivisme et 
l’empirisme à l’évolutionnisme. Ces conventions de l’économie entraînent les comportements 
gouvernementaux différents dans la transition institutionnelle. Après l’analyse de ces différences, 
on arrive à la conclusion que le gouvernement devrait prêter attention aux conditions spéciales 
initiales et faire un compromis pour les deux conventions économiques, et puis choisir la tactique 
appropriée du développement économique régional. 
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In the past few years, many economists were interested 
in the case of institutional transition in Russia and China. 
Their research focused on several problems: How to 
choose the routine of institutional transition according 
to the initial conditions? How to set the boundary of 
government’s behavior? How to construct the 
machine-processed for the regional economic 
development? For searching for answer, we should go 
back to the philosophy in social analysis and the 
convention in economics. 
Social analysis told us that many theories, which 
originated from the rationalism and the empiricism in 
philosophy, are used in the institutional transition 
analysis. Those theories resulted in two conventions in 
economics that were called the constructivism and the 
evolutionism. Those conventions influenced 
government’s behavior and made it complicated. Then 
the government’s behavior influenced deeply the 
direction and routine of institutional transition. 
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1. THE ARGUMENT IN RATIONALISM 
AND EMPIRICISM 
 
Many famous scholars involved in the argument about 
rationalism and empiricism in 18 century. The French 
philosopher named Descartes created the rationalism in 
philosophy, and then Leibniz and Rousseau set up the 
scientific spirit on the base of it, which help the natural 
science and social science to develop. At the same time, 
Francis Bacon created the empiricism in philosophy that 
emphasized experience and knowledge in reality. 
Descartes pointed out that rational method is the 
only way to find truth, and logic analysis helps people to 
construct the knowledge system. The set of rational 
methods includes instinct, analysis, deduction and 
conclusion on the base of natural spirit. The Descartes’ 
thought push modern science to go forward. Spinoza 
made the rationalism gradually to become the normal 
method in natural science and social analysis. 
On the other hand, empiricists never stopped 
criticizing the rationalism. John Locke hold an idea that 
knowledge comes from experience, but not natural 
spirit; and the range of knowledge is the boundary of 
people’s understanding ability. Hume pointed out that 
the rational analyzing method is totally wrong, by which 
the knowledge system cannot be constructed. 
Everybody who wants to find out the relationship 
between cause and effect should pay attention to 
experience and habit in reality.3 
There is no clear answer in the argument of 
rationalism and empiricism. But we learned something 
from it about the understanding ability, the origin of 
knowledge, and the method of analysis. The argument 
pushed the modern natural science and social science to 
go far, especially made two conventions to be formed in 
modern economics. 
 
2. THE CONSTRUCTIVISM AND 
EVOLUTIONISM IN ECONOMICS 
 
Economists were influenced by the debate in philosophy. 
They addressed the function of analyzing method and 
conventions in economics. They gradually accepted two 
conventions: constructivism and evolutionism, which 
emphasize the different part of analysis method. The 
former lays emphasis on the rational logic and the 
ability to construct; and the latter lays emphasis on the 
experience and the ability to explain the reality. These 
two conventions influenced several economy theories; 
and some theories even contain with both of them. 
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2.1 The constructivism 
The constructivism convention could trace back to 
Smith’s times, which was called “rational hero times”. 
Smith emphasized both historical and logic analysis, but 
Richard pushed the latter to the extreme and established 
the constructivism convention. Richard analyzed the 
reality with abstract model, and he trusted its ability to 
reconstruct real world. Some economists called it 
“Richard’s evil practice”. Then constructivism 
gradually became the main stream in economics and the 
“Senior-Mill-Cairness-Robbins system” was formed. 
Senior copied the Descartes’ logic method from 
philosophy to economics and designed four axioms 
from phenomenon as the base of economic analysis. 
Mill defined economics as an abstract science in which 
man can make a conclusion as he does in geometry. 
Cairness ascertained the function of constructivism in 
his book ”the nature of political economics and logic 
analysis method”. Robbins summed up the content of 
constructivism convention in his book “the nature and 
the value of economic science”, which includes four 
points: ①economic theory takes several hypothesis as 
the base of analysis;② the nature of economics is 
science about spirit that is the result of thinking and 
judgment;③ the validity of economics exists in the 
explanation of hypothesis, but not experiment and 
experience. 
The constructivism convention developed quickly 
after “marginal revolution”. Especially the neo-classical 
theory absorbed many new achievements in its system, 
which takes “Arrow-Debreu equilibrium model” as the 
base of analysis. The convention influenced many 
economic theories just as equilibrium theory, monetary 
theory, the transaction-cost theory and traditional game 
theory, and so on. 
 
2.2 The evolutionism 
The evolutionism convention never gave up criticizing 
the constructivism in past few years. In the 1930s’ 
argument, Hayek pointed out that man could not 
understand everybody and everything in reality with 
limited knowledge and information. He made a 
conclusion about the design of socialism system that the 
mistake of socialism comes from “fatal conceit”, and it 
will fail in the long run.4 
The further understanding in evolutionism always 
was related to the topic of institution in modern times. 
The institutionary theory developed in 1930s, which 
inherited the historical analysis tradition, and take 
totally culture and social elements into economic policy. 
Those economists who accepted institutional theory, 
paid more attention to the relationship between social 
system and the judger’s behavior, and emphasized the 
process of social evolution. They pointed many 
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mistakes in constructivism, for example Simon took 
“limited ration” to substitute the hypothesis of totally 
rational judger, and Leibenstein took “X-inefficiency” 
to doubt the behavior in searching for maximum profit. 
The new-institutionary theory pushed the 
evolutionism convention to go far. Coase thinked that 
institution includes total characteristics in culture and 
economic development, and it is the result of conflict 
and compromise in society, but not rational construction. 
He emphasized the movement and the process in 
institutional transition, and refused to use mathematic 
method. At the same time, North take 
“routine-dependence” and “informal institution” into 
institutional transition model. He pointed out that the 
formal institution elements and informal institutional 
elements caused different institution in reality together.3 
With the influence of evolutionism, more and more 
economists take it into their theories, which include 
organization’s behavior analysis, new-institutionary 
theory, evolutionary game theory, comparative analysis 
about institution and new-political economics. 
 
3. THE MODEL OF INSTITUTIONAL 
TRANSITION AND GOVERNMENT’S 
BEHAVIOR 
 
Economic science should give the explanation for the 
reality and pay attention to people’s individual behavior 
in development. The government’s behavior was very 
important in the institutional transition process and 
influenced its direction. So many economic theories 
took their main topic on government’s behavior and the 
pattern of its tactic. 
 
3.1  The case in macro-economy 
We noticed the case in macro-economy on the country 
and international relationship. The most interesting 
cases are the reform in Russian and China, which give 
us different experience. 
3.1.1 the drastic reform in Russian and 
constructivism 
The institutional transition in Russian includes two 
meaning: political reform and economic reform. Most 
of economists were interested in the latter, which was 
designed by Sachs and was called “shock treatment”. 
Sachs pointed out that the right way to reconstruct 
economic system is to rapidly liberalize price, privatize 
property right and stabilize politics. In this case, the 
Russian government is a leading role in this reform, and 
it privatized most of state-owned enterprise even in 
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2000 (6). 
eight months.4 
Many economists agreed with the viewpoint that the 
political reform was successful in Russian but its 
economic reform failed. The “shock treatment” whose 
object is to reconstruct a set of market economy system, 
includes the internal coincidence in market economy. Is 
it another kind of “fatal conceit”? 
Putin took a set of action to reconfirm the direction 
of institutional transition and the tactic of government’s 
behavior on the base of culture, civilization and 
economy in Russian. He changed the thought in 
Yeltsin’s times, and he noticed the mutual effect in 
politics and economy. So the central government’s 
behavior will change in Russia. 
3.1.2 The gradual reform in China and 
evolutionism 
The gradual reform in China is mainly on economic 
institution, which transferred social system from 
planned economy to socialism market economy. Hong 
(2001) pointed out that the market-oriented reform has 
three stages: the first stage is to create competitive 
market; the second stage is to adjust the structure of 
property right; the third stage is to cultivate the modern 
market economy.5  China’s reform is in the second stage 
now. Many economists agreed that these stages are not 
the result of design, but the transition process in reality. 
In the past first stage, Chinese government adopted 
additional development, double-price system and 
experiment in certain region. it created the “Chinese 
mystery” in the way of “crossing the river by touching 
stone”. 
The gradual reform in China obviously belongs to 
evolutionism. In fact, in the shortage of knowledge and 
information about market economy, policymakers in 
China cannot make sure the final object of reform and 
the tactic of government’s behavior. Then they adopted 
the gradual pattern of economic reform. Many evidence 
proved that the gradual pattern cost lowly in the first 
stage, which took the relationship between economic 
elements and social culture into thought, for reducing 
mistakes from constructivism. 
The gradual reform in China was successful 
according to its economic effect, which existed in the 
developing rate, the resident’s living level and the 
private organization’s efficiency. On the other hand, we 
should notice many problems such as bureaucracy, 
unfairness and imperfect social guarantee system in the 
transition process. So the Chinese government should 
adjust the tactic of its behavior. 
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3.2 The case in micro-economy 
In this part, we discuss the case in regional 
micro-economy and organization. Especially in the 
eastern region of China, the government’s behavior 
shows obviously gradual characteristics. Because of the 
direction in socialism market economy, the regional 
government transferred his behavior from “inactivity” 
to “activity”, from unconscious evolutionism to 
“evolutionary rationalism”. 
3.2.1  The regional government’s “inactivity” 
At the beginning of China’s economic reform, more and 
more private economic organizations existed in the 
eastern region, which improved the regional economy. 
But regional government in eastern China confronted 
the choice between the regional economic development 
and political stability. Being short of knowledge and 
information, they tried many ways and finally adopted 
inactive tactic. 
Inactive tactic doesn’t mean that the regional 
governments give up any control and regulation in the 
regional economy, which means inactive action when it 
confronts difficult problems. This tactic obviously is a 
better choice when those governments don’t want to 
make mistakes. We call it “limited ration”. 
Because of this tactic, private economic 
organizations in eastern China became stronger and 
stronger, which improved the regional economy. With 
the gradually clear macro-tendency, those regional 
governments in eastern China will ascertain the object 
of their behavior and become more and more active. 
3.2.2 The regional government’s “activity”  
The document named “the central authorities’ decision 
about the socialism market economy” (1993) 
emphasized clearly the direction of institutional 
transition in China. Those regional governments in 
eastern China had the consciousness to regulate and 
control the regional economy. At the same time, those 
problems in the developing process of non-state-owned 
economy became apparent, such as imperfect market 
system and unharmonious regulation, and so on. These 
two sides make regional governments transfer their 
tactic, which belongs to “evolutionary rationalism”. The 
regional government in eastern China will take more 
activity in the regulation and regional economic 
development. 
The “evolutionary rationalism” ask for the clear 
boundary of government’s behavior. What should he do? 
What does he must do? Many economists were 
interested in these topics. According to experience in 
the eastern China, the regional government should take 
his activity on two points: the first thing is to take all 
elements in this region into economic policy such as 
special social culture and economic conditions; the 
second thing is to build the perfect surroundings in the 
regional economy. These changes stimulate us to 
research further the regional government’s behavior. 
4. THE APPROPRIATE CHOICE OF 
GOVERNMENT’S BEHAVIOR 
 
The constructivism convention and the evolutionism 
convention in economics influenced government’s 
behavior in many cases of institutional transition. There 
are some key factors for us to decide how to solve these 
problems in institutional transition and economic 
development, and how to compromise the 
constructivism convention and the evolutionism 
convention inside the government’s behavior in China. 
We address two principles: the compromise of different 
conventions and the specific characteristics in different 
regions. 
 
4.1 The compromise of different 
conventions 
The constructivism convention and the evolutionism 
convention in economics separately correspond the 
drastic reform and the gradual reform in reality. Many 
Economists paid more attention to their cause and 
characteristics, but not their result. Yang pointed out in 
his book “economic reform and political transition” that 
the core of institutional transition is political transition, 
and the effects of institutional transition cannot be 
judged by the rate of economic development. Kolodko 
(2000) also showed his viewpoints in his book “from 
shock to treatment” that drastic reform and the gradual 
reform should take place in different region: firstly, the 
drastic pattern should be adopted to liberalize price and 
stabilize political situation; secondly, the gradual 
pattern should be adopted in privatizing property and 
reconstructing the structure of economic organizations; 
thirdly, the gradual pattern suit the reconstruction of 
micro-economy.6 
So we find out that the constructivism convention 
and the evolutionism maybe will turn into compromise. 
Looking back the institutional transition in China, the 
gradual pattern pushed the Chinese economy to better 
situation, but it has a limited boundary. The 
neo-classical theory told us that the market economic 
system should keep in coincidence. However, the 
“shock treatment” was formed only in the economic 
coincidence, but not in the whole social economic 
system. We learned from it that the constructivism 
supports the object of institutional transition and its 
theory, which call for the coincidence of market 
economy system; and the evolutionism supports the 
criteria for government’s behavior in the institutional 
transition process, which call for thinking about all 
historical elements and experience in certain region. 
From philosophy to conventions in economics, the 
central government and regional governments changed 
their tactics in the institutional transition, which result in 
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“limited government”. The “limited government” 
doesn’t mean the little government, but the clear tactic 
of government’s behavior in the institutional transition 
and economic development. This notion includes three 
points: the first meaning is to ascertain the direction of 
institutional transition and the guidance; the second 
meaning is to cultivate the supporting system such as 
public facilities, regulation institution and law for the 
market economy; the third meaning is to provide more 
chance for free competition and avoid interfering the 
action in market. 
 
4.2  Specific characteristics in different 
regions 
These different initial specific characteristics result in 
different patterns of institutional transition in different 
regions, which influence the tactic of government’s 
behavior. We want to analyze this topic in two sides: 
firstly, the model of institutional transition and central 
government’s behavior in China cannot be substituted 
and copied; secondly, the characteristics of regional 
government’s behavior in eastern China and western 
China are so different. 
4.2.1 The specific characteristics of Chinese 
institutional transition 
According to Zhou’s (2002) viewpoints, the specific 
characteristics of institutional transition come from six 
elements: the first is the structure of social institution on 
the base of economic development; the second is the 
central government’s preference and interest; the third is 
the structure of powerful group; the forth is the style of 
powerful group’s game action; the fifth is the pattern of 
public policy; the sixth is the common view to form the 
public policy. 7 Because of these elements, the routine 
in different society cannot be same. Many economists 
emphasized the specific characteristics of initial 
conditions and policy-making process when they 
analyze Chinese reform. These elements result in the 
special routine of Chinese reform and the “dependence 
of routine”. So “transplanting institution” is infeasible 
and market economy system in modern country cannot 
be simply used in China. At the same time, the lesson in 
Chinese reform cannot be copied in other countries. 
So we make a conclusion on the specific 
characteristics of Chinese reform, which the central 
government should search for the routine of institutional 
transition and development according to the special 
initial conditions. Economists have no excuse to doubt 
the central government’s policy according to the model 
of modern market economy in western countries. The 
specific characteristics naturally cannot be the excuse to 
avoid responsibility for the central government. We set 
up criteria to judge the government’s behavior, for 
                                                        
7 Xiaoliang Zhou. The difference and multiplicity of external 
institution: review of institutional revolution in institutional 
transition theory. The review of economics, 2002 (3). 
example the economic efficiency, the extent of social 
development and the living level. 
4.2.2 The difference in eastern China and 
western China 
The difference in eastern China and western China exist 
not only in the extent of economic development, but 
also in the social culture and the structure of economic 
organization. For the sake of historic and regional 
elements in eastern China, private economy in eastern 
China developed quickly; economic organizations have 
different styles; the supporting system for market 
economy is forming; private organizations are searching 
for better economic institution. So regional 
governments in eastern China have the ability and 
motive to change their behavior. They should set a new 
model to make policy on the base of special initial 
conditions and the need of new regional economic 
situation. Their responsibilities are not only to serve the 
regional organizations, but also to set a better 
supporting system for the inner coincidence of market 
economy. In a word, they will transfer their behavior 
from unconscious evolutionism to “evolutionary 
constructivism”. 
However, western China has different conditions in 
regional economic development, social culture and 
geographical features. He fell behind of eastern China. 
The first task of regional governments in western China 
is to develop, and the institutional transition is the 
second task. These regional governments in western 
China should pay more attention to perfect the 
surroundings for the private investment and improve the 
efficiency of regulation. They shouldn’t destroy the 
whole social economic institution at present and 
construct new one. So we can say that the regional 
government in western China should learn more from 
the evolutionism. 
Until now, we analyze the government’s behavior 
from philosophy to conventions in economics, from the 
case of institutional transition to the tactic of regional 
government’s behavior at present. We have gotten a 
certain belief: man should search for the truth in reality, 
but he cannot know everything. The government will 
find out his right tactic from the constructivism 
convention and the evolutionism convention. In the 
final, the sole reason of his behavior is the need of 
political group and economic organizations, and the sole 
criteria to judge his behavior is to improve the fortune 
and the fairness in the real world. 
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